Nuclear submarine deal raises the stakes in tackling China

The federal government’s surprise decision to scrap the 2016 submarine deal with France and instead use British and US nuclear technology is a gamble which will take decades to pay off and comes with significant risks,including for Australia’s already-fraught relations with China.

Prime Minister Scott Morrison explained the decision to scrap the deal signed five years ago to buy 12 diesel-powered submarines from Naval Group of France by saying that the eight Anglo-US nuclear-powered vessels will have “greater power,greater stealth,more carrying capacity”.

The cutting edge nuclear technology is clearly required not just to protect Australia’s sea lanes but for use in distant oceans against a sophisticated opponent,which can only be China.

While Mr Morrison is probably right that nuclear submarines will be more effective in this role,the message of strength he wants to send to Beijing is somewhat undercut by the chaotic nature of Australia’s decision-making process so far.

By changing horses midstream,Australia has already wasted billions of dollars and hurt our international reputation.

France,which should be an ally in our dealings with China,says Australia has broken the spirit and perhaps the letter of the deal signed in 2016. Breaking the agreement will also cost us billions.

The new plan is a chance for a fresh start but on paper it solves few of the manufacturing problems thatblighted the French deal and raises many new ones.

In order to protect jobs at Adelaide dockyards,Australia has retained the complicated requirement in the French deal that a large share of the construction work will be done in South Australia.

Australia now faces the added challenges of splitting construction between three continents rather than two and of mastering nuclear technology,which barely exists in this country.

It was precisely because of the difficulties of developing a local nuclear power sector that Australia rejected the option of buying existing French nuclear subs in 2016 and instead asked the French to modify the designs to diesel.

In one sign of the challenges ahead,it will take at least 18 months to work out basic details such as whether to use British or US designs,and the vessels won’t be ready until the late 2030s.

If nuclear technology was the issue,Mr Morrison might simply have asked the French or the US to sell nuclear-powered vessels off the shelf.

But Mr Morrison has clearly decided to use the submarine deal to tie Australia symbolically closer to the US,which he says is the best way to deal with the “less benign” strategic situation in the region.

He says the new Australia-Britain-US alliance extends beyond the submarine contract to other forms of co-operation and creates a “forever alliance”.

This show of solidarity could be helpful in deterring China from taking aggressive action against Taiwan or elsewhere in east Asia and might stiffen the resolve of countries such as South Korea,Japan and India which are also considering how to manage China’s new power.

But there are risks. For example,if the federal government fails to produce the new subs on schedule and close to budget,it will undermine Australia’s credibility and leave a hole in our naval defences.

Moreover,despite Mr Morrison’s invitation on Thursday to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping,the US deal will aggravate Australia’s fraught ties with China and expose us to accusations of being Washington’s lapdog.

That should not stop us but Australia must proceed with great caution in this risky game.

Note from the Editor

TheHeraldeditor Lisa Davies writes a weekly newsletter exclusively for subscribers. To have it delivered to your inbox,please sign up here.

Since the Herald was first published in 1831,the editorial team has believed it important to express a considered view on the issues of the day for readers,always putting the public interest first.

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